This volume not only provides the first critical edition with an English translation of the famous correspondence of Nicholas of Autrecourt , but also an assessment of his views and the views of those to whom the letters were addressed.

This edition of Giraldus Odonis' Logica for the first time gives access to an important and original treatise, which has unduly been neglected since the author's death. It is also important in that it gives evidence of interesting achievements in the field of logic outside the anti-metaphysical circle surrounding Ockham.

Le but de cet article est une critique de la philosophie politique de M. Eric Weil. Par opposition à M. Weil, l'auteur définit la „politique" ici comme l'art du réalisable, à préciser comme : l'art d'arriver à court terme à une organisation de la société qu'on estime meilleure, et cela en employant tous les moyens permis. L'homme politique n'est pas, ainsi que l'affirme M. Weil, un „saint de Vtmiversel”, qui, en ce qui concerne l'emploi de la violence, se trouve au-dessus (...) de la loi. Ce „politicien-éducateur” est en vérité l'appui des régimes totalitaires et est d'ailleurs inconcevable en dehors de ceux-ci. En outre la théorie de M. Weil contient un certain nombre de contradictions internes et, si on la mesure à la pratique, elle se trouve être déficiente à beaucoup d'égards. Contre la conception platonicienne de M. Weil l'auteur défend la thèse que la politique n'est pas une infraction, regrettable mais inévitable, à „la morale”. C'est la tâche de l'homme politique de supprimer toutes les absurdités, inconséquences et injustices qui entachent les structures de la société. Ce qui, concrètement, est absurde, inconséquent ou injuste n'est pas déterminé par „la morale”, mais par la conscience du droit et par le sentiment moral d'une époque donnée. Les „certitudes” d'où part l'homme politique ne sont pas des Idées platoniciennes, mais des hypothèses de travail, qui dérivent leur contenu non pas de la contemplation des Idées, mais d'une notion de ce qui est juste et désirable, notion qui est déterminée par les conditions matérielles et spirituelles et qui se trouve dans un changement continuel. (shrink)

This study offers a re-interpretation of basic elements of Aristotle's semantics and metaphysics on the basis of a meticulous reconstruction of his semantics. By eliminating anachronistic conceptions commonly ascribed to him, many shortcomings or obscurities he is accused of will disappear.

The first critical edition of the _Syncategoreumata_ by the thirteenth-century philosopher Peter of Spain, accompanied by a facing-page English translation to make its contents accessible to modern readers. The introduction gives an account of all the manuscripts used for the edition. Extensive indexes have been added to facilitate the reader's orientation in the book.

IT is well known that the art of logic (logica or diale(c)tica) knew a remarkable flourishing period during the twelfth century. In the first half of the century its main centres in Paris were: the School of Notre DameI, of St. Victor2, of the Petit Pont3 and of Mont Ste Geneviève4. The present paper aims to offer some new evidence from the manuscripts on the teaching of logic as given in the School of Mont Ste.

Building on the recent scholarship of Bonnie Kent, Christian Trottmann, and especially L.M. de Rijk, this volume gathers together studies by other specialists on Odonis, covering his ideas in economics, logic, metaphysics, ethics, natural ...

Basically, a historian's conception of history is to be judged by the status he assigns to historical fact. We on our part have defined fact as the mental entity to which direct reference is made by a descriptive statement accepted as true (1.2-1.4). Next, we have tried to throw further light on this conception, not least by enlisting the aid of linguistics (1.5-1.7). History-as distinct from what others have termed 'history in an objective sense'-has been defined as 'histoire connaissance', whose (...) central concerns it is to render insightful what we have called the vis-à-vis (XYZ), sometimes indicated by the, to me repellent, term 'histoire réalité' (2.2). Further reflection on what ultimately constitutes fact has led us to adopt, in line with others, an extension of Kuhn's paradigm concept. (shrink)

Each inhabitant of our world Gilbert calls an id quod est or subsistens. Its main constituents are the subsistentiae and these are accompanied by the 'accidents', quantity and quality. The subsistent owes its status to a collection of inferior members of the Aristotelian class of accidents, which to Gilbert 's mind are rather 'accessories' or 'attachments from without'. The term 'substantia' is used both to stand for substance and substantial form, i.e., that by which something is subsistent. The collection of (...) subsistentiae or the forma totius is called natura. However, 'natura' is also used to stand for either just one subsistentia or all the forms found in a subsistens even including its 'accidental' forms. The inclusion of all kinds of accidents is seldom found in the intension of the word 'natura'. One of the key notions featuring in Gilbert 's ontology is esse aliquid. 'To be a-something' has a threefold import. First, it means 'to be only some thing', and to miss perfection. Second, it has the positive sense of 'being a something', i.e. 'being determinate and well-delineated', not indefinite, not formless that is. Third, 'to be a something' implies concreteness, corporealness and singularity. (shrink)

This paper aims to assess medieval terminism, particularly supposition theory, in the development of Aristotelian thought in the Latin West. The focus is on what the present author considers the gist of Aristotle’s strategy of argument, to wit conceptual focalization and categorization. This argumentative strategy is more interesting as it can be compared to the modern tool known as ‘scope distinction’.